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I. Introduction
Increased attention by policy makers to the threat of global climate change
has brought with it considerable attention to the possibility of encouraging
the growth of forests as a means of sequestering carbon dioxide (National
Academy of Sciences 1992; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
1994).1  This approach has, in fact, become an explicit element of both U.S.
and international climate policies (U.S. Department of Energy 1991; Clinton
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1After fossil-fuel combustion, deforestation is the second largest source of carbon dioxide
emissions to the atmosphere.  There are three pathways along which carbon sequestration is
of relevance for atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide:  carbon storage in biological
ecosystems; carbon storage in durable wood products; and substitution of biomass fuels for
fossil fuels (Richards and Stokes 95).  The model developed in this paper considers the first
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and Gore 1993; United Nations General Assembly 1992).  This high level of
interest has been due, in part, to:  suggestions that sufficient lands are available
to use the approach to mitigate a substantial share of annual carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions (Marland 1988; Lashof and Tirpak 1989; and Trexler 1991);
and claims that growing trees to sequester carbon is a relatively inexpensive
means of combating climate change (Dudek and LeBlanc 1990; National
Academy of Sciences 1992; Sedjo and Solomon 1989).  In other words, the
serious attention given by policy makers to carbon sequestration can partly
be explained by (implicit) assertions about respective marginal cost functions.
This paper develops a methodology whereby estimates of the costs of
carbon sequestration can be developed on the basis of evidence from
observations of landowners’ behavior when confronted with the opportunity
costs of alternative land uses.  The analytical model takes account of
silvicultural understanding of the intertemporal linkages between
deforestation and carbon emissions, on the one hand, and between forestation
and carbon sequestration, on the other.  The results support the efficacy and
potential value of this analytical approach.
The simplest economic analyses of the costs of carbon sequestration have
derived single point estimates of average costs associated with particular
sequestration levels (Marland 1988; Sedjo and Solomon 1989; Dudek and
LeBlanc 1990; Rubin, et.al. 1992; Masera, Bellon, and Segura 1995).  In a
number of cases, it has been assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that land
(opportunity) costs are zero (Dixon, et.al. 1994; New York State Energy
Office 1993; Winjum, Dixon, and Schroeder 1992; Van Kooten, Arthur, and
Wilson 1992).  Another set of studies —essentially «engineering/costing
models» — have constructed marginal cost schedules by adopting land rental
rates or purchase costs derived from surveys for representative types or
locations of land, and then sorting these in ascending order of cost (Moulton
and Richards 1990; Richards, Moulton, and Birdsey 1993).  Simulations
models include a model of the lost profits due to removing land from
agricultural production (Parks and Hardie 1995), a mathematical
programming model of the agricultural sector and the timber market used to
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estimate the loss of consumer surplus from food price increases due to
reduction of agricultural land availability (Adams, et.al. 1993), a related model
incorporating the effects of agricultural price support programs (Callaway
and McCarl 1996), and a dynamic simulation model of forestry (Swinehart
1996).  Lastly, an analysis by Plantinga (1995) adopts land-use elasticities
from an econometric study to estimate sequestration costs in southwestern
Wisconsin.
Each of these previous analyses has its own comparative advantages,
and a number of the studies have absolute advantages along particular
dimensions.  The research described in the current paper draws on some of
the best features of each, including the carbon levelization method of Adams
et.al. (1993) and Moulton and Richards (1990), and the intertemporal carbon
yield curves of Richards, Moulton, and Birdsey (1993).  Nearly all of the
previous analyses are potentially limited, however, by their inability to reflect
the actual preferences of landowners, as revealed — for example — by
landowners’ decisions regarding the disposition of their lands in the face of
relevant economic signals.2  One aspect of this problem has been described
by Richards, Moulton, and Birdsey (1993, pp. 911-912) as follows:
One of the difficulties in conducting an engineering or «least cost» type of analysis
is that it assumes that 100 percent of the marginal agricultural land is available for
conversion to tree plantations.  In fact, that level of participation by agricultural
land owners is not likely in the absence of the exercise of eminent domain or public
taking powers.
In the words of these same researchers, there has been an observed «tendency
of some land owners to hang on to their land longer or more stubbornly» (p.
912) than the simplest economic calculations would suggest.
There are a number of reasons why landowners’ actual behavior might
not be well predicted by «engineering» or «least cost» analyses:  (1) land-use
2The exception is the analysis by Plantinga (1995), which is similar in some respects to the
methodology developed in this paper.
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changes can involve irreversible investments in the face of uncertainty (Parks
1995), and so option values — ignored in engineering and least-cost analyses
— may be important (Pindyck 1991); (2) there may be non-pecuniary returns
to landowners from forest uses of land (Plantinga 1995), as well as from
agricultural uses; (3) liquidity constraints or simple «decision-making inertia»
may mean that economic incentives will affect landowners only with some
delay; and (4) there may be private, market benefits or costs of alternative
land uses (or of changes from one use to another) of which the analyst is
unaware.
We seek to address these problems by employing an econometric model
of actual land-use behavior to derive the costs of carbon sequestration.  Thus,
the paper is intended to be illustrative of how existing econometric analyses
of land use, which already exist for a number of countries, can be used to
develop better region-specific estimates of the marginal costs of carbon
sequestration.
In Part II, we describe the analytical model, including a brief summary of
the structural model of historical land use that is drawn from a previous
analysis, the dynamic simulation model of future land use, and the related
simulation model of carbon sequestration.  In Part III, we describe the results
of simulations that facilitate the derivation of estimates of the marginal costs
of carbon sequestration.  In Part IV, we conclude with some observations on
potential future applications.
II.  Analytical Model
We draw upon econometrically-estimated parameters of a structural model
of land use, and layer upon it a model of the relationships that link changes
in alternative land uses with changes in the time paths of CO2 emission and
sequestration.  The major steps in the analysis are as follows.  First, a dynamic
optimization model of individual landowner decision making is solved with
basic control-theoretic techniques.  The model focuses on the empirically
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relevant land-use options of forest and farm.3  By allowing for unobserved
heterogeneity of land quality, the individual necessary conditions from that
optimization model are aggregated into an econometric specification, the
parameters of which are estimated with available aggregate time-series and
cross-sectional data.  These results provide the first building block for the
model of carbon sequestration.
The estimated econometric model indicates how land use may be
anticipated to change in response to changes in the economic climate,
including such relevant factors as expected timber and agricultural product
prices, and costs of changing land use.  Hence, a properly specified and
related simulation model can produce fitted values of land use changes that
would take place in response to government policies such as taxes on
deforestation or subsidies on forestation.  Such simulations yield, in effect, a
forest supply function.
Next, a set of models of the various relationships that exist between the
time path of deforestation and carbon emissions and the time path of
forestation and carbon sequestration are linked with the land-use model, so
that we can predict net carbon emissions/sequestration associated with a
given tax/subsidy and a given set of background economic variables.  Finally,
the simulation model is modified so that its results are expressed in terms of
marginal costs of carbon sequestration and total annual sequestration.  This
provides estimates of the key statistic:  the incremental costs of sequestration.
A.   A Structural, Empirical Model of Land Use
In previous work with a distinctly different policy motivation, a dynamic
optimization model was developed of a landowner’s decision of whether to
keep his or her land in its status quo use or convert it to serve another
3 In both industrialized nations and in developing countries, nearly all deforestation is
associated with conversion to agricultural use (Jepma, Asaduzzaman, Mintzer, Maya, and
Al-Moneef 1995).
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purpose.4  Landowners are assumed to observe current and past values of
economic, hydrologic, and climatic factors relevant to decisions regarding
the use of their lands for forestry or agricultural production,5 and on this
basis form expectations of future values of respective variables.  In particular,
landowners observe agricultural prices and production costs, typical
agricultural yields for their area, typical timber returns, and the suitability of
individual land parcels for agriculture.
Landowners are assumed to attempt to maximize the expected long-term
economic return to the set of productive activities that can be carried out on
their land.  They face ongoing decisions of whether to keep land in its current
state — either forested or agricultural use — or to convert the land to the
other state.  Relevant factors a landowner would be expected to consider
include:  typical agricultural revenues in the area (Ait); the quality of a specific
land parcel for agricultural production (qijt); agricultural costs of production
(Mit); typical forestry revenues (fit); and the cost of converting land from a
forested state to use as cropland (Cit).  Thus, a risk-neutral landowner will
seek to maximize the present discounted value of the stream of expected
future returns:
4 A detailed description of the dynamic optimization model and the derivation of the
econometrically estimatable model is found in Stavins and Jaffe 1990.  An illustration of the
use of the model for environmental simulation is found in Stavins 1990.
5 For the geographic area of the investigation — thirty-six counties along the Mississippi
River in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi — it is empirically reasonable to focus on
these two alternative land uses.
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where i indexes counties, j indexes individual land parcels, and t indexes
time; upper case letters are stocks or present values; and lowercase letters
are flows.6  The variables are:
Ait = discounted present value of the future stream of typical expected
agricultural revenues per acre in county i and time t;
qijt = parcel-specific index of feasibility of agricultural production, including
effects of soil quality and soil moisture;
gijt = acres of land converted from forested to agricultural use (deforestation);
vijt = acres of cropland returned to a forested condition (forestation);
Mit = expected cost of agricultural production per acre, expressed as the
discounted present value of an infinite future stream;
Cit = average cost of conversion per acre;
Pit = the Palmer hydrological drought index and a is a parameter to be
estimated, to allow precipitation and soil moisture to influence
conversion costs;
fit = expected annual net income from forestry per acre (annuity of stumpage
value);
Sijt = stock (acres) of forest;
 rt = real interest rate;
Wit = windfall of net revenue per acre from a one-time clear cut of forest
(prior to conversion to agricultural use);
Dit = expected present discounted value of loss of income (when converting
to forest) due to gradual regrowth of forest (first harvest of forest does
not occur until the year t + R, where R is the exogenously determined
rotation length);
6 This specification implies that all prices and costs are exogenously determined in broader
national or international markets, a reasonable assumption in the present application.
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gijt = maximum feasible rate of deforestation; and
vijt = maximum feasible rate of forestation.
As is described in Appendix 1, application of control theoretic methods
yields a pair of necessary conditions for changes in land use. Forestation
(conversion of agricultural cropland to forest) occurs if a parcel is cropland
and:
0    >    )   M   +   q    A   -   F
~   ( it ijt it it ·
whereit  , delayed net forest revenue, equals Fit - Dit, and Fit = fit/rt.  That is, a
parcel of cropland should be converted to forestry use if the present value of
expected net forest revenue exceeds the present value of expected net
agricultural revenue. On the other hand, deforestation occurs if a parcel is
forested and:
(6)
where FNit, net forest revenue, equals Fit - Wit.  That is, a forested parcel
should be converted to cropland if the present value of expected net
agricultural revenue exceeds the present value of expected net forest revenue
plus the cost of conversion.
Inequalities (5) and (6) imply that all land in a county (of given quality)
will be in the same use in the steady state.  In reality, of course, counties are
observed to be a mix of forest and farmland.  Although this may partly reflect
deviations from the steady state, it is due largely to the heterogeneity of
land, particularly in regard to its quality (suitability) for agriculture.  Such
unobserved heterogeneity can be parameterized within an econometrically
estimatable model so that the individual necessary conditions for land-use
changes (equations (5) and (6)) aggregate into a single-equation model, in
which the parameters of the basic benefit-cost relationships and of the
underlying, unobserved heterogeneity can be estimated simultaneously.  In
Appendix 2, the complete model is derived:
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where all Greek letters are parameters that can be estimated econometrically;
FORCHit is the change in forest land as a share of total county area; FORCHit
a
is forestation (abandonment of cropland) as a share of total county area;
FORCHit
c is deforestation (conversion of forest) as a share of total county area;
Dit
a and Dit
c are dummy variables for forestation and deforestation,
respectively; li is a county-level fixed-effect parameter; fit is an independent
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coefficients7 for forestation and deforestation; F signifies the cumulative,
standard normal distribution function; qit
y is the threshold value of
(unobserved) land quality (suitability for agriculture) below which the
incentive for forestation manifests itself; qit
x is the threshold value of land
quality above which the incentive for deforestation manifests itself; Tit is total
county area; Ni is the share of a county that is naturally protected from periodic
flooding; Eit is an index of the share of a county that has been artificially
protected from flooding by Federal programs (by time t); m is the mean of the
unobserved land-quality distribution; and s is the standard deviation of that
distribution.8
A simplified, pictorial representation of the  model  is  provided  in Figure
1. The skewed distribution in the figure represents the parameterized
lognormal distribution of unobserved land quality; and qit
y and qit
x are the
forestation and deforestation thresholds, respectively.  Note that each is a
(different) function of the benefits and costs of forest production relative to
agricultural production.  The asymmetries between equations (11) and (12)
cause the separation between the two thresholds (where economic signals
suggest to leave land in its existing state, whether that be forest or farm).
Thus, if expected forest revenues increase, both thresholds shift to the right
and we would anticipate that some quantity of farmland would be converted
to forest uses.  Likewise, an increase in expected agricultural prices means a
shift of the two thresholds to the left, and consequent deforestation.
7  Conditions (5) and (6) imply that conversion of land to its optimal use (conditional upon
prices) will be instantaneous.  As suggested above, there are several reasons why this may not
be the case, including liquidity constraints, uncertainty about the permanence of price
movements, decision-making inertia, and an uneven forest-age distribution.  The partial
adjustment mechanism allows for gradual movement toward the optimal state.  Given the
aggregate nature of the analysis, the coefficients indicate the probability that a landowner not
in equilibrium in a given time period will switch to the optimal use within the initial time period.
8 Other parameters to be estimated are:  a, the effect of weather on conversion costs; b1, the
effect of government flood-control programs on agricultural feasibility; b2, the effect of these
programs on the heterogeneity mean; and b3, the effect of programs on the standard deviation.
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f(q)
qy     qx q
Using panel data for 36 counties in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi,
during the period 1935-1984, the parameters of the model embodied in
equations (7) through (12), above, were estimated with nonlinear least squares
procedures (Stavins and Jaffe 1990). The basic results are found in Table 1.9
9 The time dimension of the panel has observations every five years; hence, the time series
contains ten periods, and the entire panel contains 360 observations.  Estimated parameters
are all of the expected sign, and nearly all estimates are significant at the 90, 95, or 99
percent level.  Both parameter and standard error estimates are robust with respect to
modifications of the specification, and the dynamic goodness-of-fit, based upon Theil’s
(1961) measure, is 0.675.
Figure 1. The Distribution of Land Quality and Economic Thresholds
of Forestation and DeforestationJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Table 1. Parameter Estimates for Simulationsa
Parameter Interpretation Estimate
ga Forestation partial adjustment 0.36717b
(0.184)c
gc Deforestation partial adjustment 0.64826
(0.154)
m Mean of unobserved quality distribution 1.11650
(0.364)
s Standard deviation of unobserved 0.43848
quality distribution (0.067)
a Weather impact on conversion cost 1.59720
(0.304)
b1 Federal program impact on agricultural 8.93700
feasibility (2.465)
b2 Federal program impact on heterogeneity 0.77193
mean (0.774)
b3 Federal program impact on 0.42799
heterogeneity standard deviation (0.183)
Goodness of fitd 0.6747
Log likelihood value 791.698
Degrees of freedom 316
a For a detailed discussion of the parameter estimation, see:  Stavins and Jaffe 1990; and
Stavins 1990.
b The model also contains 36 county dummy variables.
c Robust (heteroscedastic consistent) standard error estimates appear below parameter
estimates.
d The dynamic goodness of fit statistic is equal to 1 - Theil’s U statistic, based on comparing
predicted and actual net rates of deforestation and forestation, at the county level, across
time.
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B. A Dynamic Simulation Model of Future Land Use
The initial step — conceptually — in moving from an estimated model of
historical land use to a model of carbon sequestration involves introducing
relevant silvicultural elements into the necessary conditions previously
derived.  There are three principal silvicultural dimensions to be considered:
symmetries and asymmetries between forestation and deforestation;
alternative species for forestation; and alternative management regimes.
First, it should be noted that equations (11) and (12) already exhibit two
significant asymmetries between forestation and deforestation.  Forestation
produces a supply of timber (and hence, a forest-revenue stream) only with
some delay, since the first harvest subsequent to establishment occurs at the
completion of the first rotation, while deforestation involves an immediate,
one-time revenue windfall from cutting of the stand, net of a loss of future
revenues from continued forest production.  Additionally, under actual
management practices during the sample period of historical analysis, costs
(Cit) were associated with converting forestland to agricultural cropland, but
no costs were involved with essentially abandoning cropland and allowing
it to return to a forested state.  For the simulations associated with carbon
sequestration policies, however, we also allow for the possibility of “tree
farming,” that is, intensive management of the forest, which brings with it
significant costs of establishment.10
Second, there is the silvicultural dimension of choice of species.  In the
econometric analysis, only mixed stands11 were considered to reflect historical
10Forest establishment costs include the costs of planting (purchase of seedlings, site
preparation, and transplanting), post-planting treatments, and care required to ensure
establishment (Moulton and Richards 1990).  We adopt a value of $92/acre ($1990), based
upon estimates by Richards, Moulton, and Birdsey (1993) for converted cropland in the
Delta (three-state) region.  Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the major variables
used in the simulation analysis.
11Mixed stands of appropriate shares of various species of hardwoods and softwoods, specific
to each county and time period, were included in the data used for econometric estimation.
The calculated revenue streams draw upon price data for both sawlogs and pulpwood in
proportion to use, based upon 55-year rotations.
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reality, but in the carbon-sequestration context it is important to consider the
possibility of both mixed stands and tree farms (plantations of pure pine).  We
develop revenue streams for both, based upon observed practice in the
region.12
The third silvicultural dimension is the choice of management regime.
The historical analysis assumed that all forests were periodically harvested
for their timber.  For purposes of carbon sequestration, however, we should
consider not only such conventional management regimes, but also the
possibility of establishing «permanent stands» that are never harvested.13
These three sets of silvicultural considerations lead to the following
respecification of equation (11):
12The tree-farm revenue streams represent a mix of 80 percent loblolly pine and 20 percent
slash pine, based upon practice in the area (Daniels 1994).  A rotation length of 45 years is
utilized, also reflecting standard practice (Moulton and Richards 1990).
13For permanent stands, no revenue from harvesting is generated, although establishment
costs are still incurred for setting up plantations.
14  In all four scenarios, the revenue associated with a decision to deforest, FNit, is the present
value of the one-time windfall from cutting at the time of deforestation minus the opportu-
nity cost associated with the foregone stream of revenues from periodic cutting of an
unmanaged mixed stand.  This and all forest revenues are in the form of capitalized «stump-
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where  Fits = delayed net forest revenue (Fits - Dits), now subscripted by s
to indicate species (mixed stand or pine), and set equal to zero for the case
of permanent (unharvested) stands; and
     Kit = establishment costs associated with planting a pine-based tree
farm.
Combining variable values associated with these silvicultural dimensions
into logical sets yields four scenarios to be investigated (Table 3):14  (1)
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natural regrowth of a mixed stand, periodically harvested; (2) natural regrowth
of a «permanent» mixed stand (no periodic harvest); (3) planting of a pine
plantation, periodically harvested; and (4) planting of a permanent pine
plantation.
As explained above, we have assumed that deforestation brings about
not only a loss of future forest revenue, Fit , but also a one-time windfall of
income, Wit , from the immediate sale of timber from the felled forest, the
difference being net forest revenue, FNit. In the context of carbon
sequestration, it becomes important to allow for another possibility as well,
namely that at the time of deforestation, merchantable timber is not sold, but
simply burned along with all other on-site material.  In this case, FNit is
replaced by Fit in equation (12), above (and equation (15), below).This
alternative, which becomes quite important when we consider its carbon
consequences, yields a set of four additional scenarios, numbered 5 through
8 in Table 3.
Next, we introduce some policy-inspired modifications to develop a forest
supply function. First, note that dynamic simulations of fitted values of the
model, employing current/expected values of all variables (including prices),
will generate predictions of future forestation and/or deforestation (Stavins
1990). These results, aggregated across the 36 counties, constitute our
baseline for policy analysis.  Second, we can simulate what land-use changes
would be forthcoming with changed values of specific variables.  In general,
we can examine the consequences of public policies that affect the economic
incentives faced by landowners.  The difference in forestation/deforestation
between the first (baseline) and the second (counterfactual) simulation is
the predicted impact of a given policy.
In order to generate a representation of the forest supply function, several
types of policies can be considered.  A payment (subsidy) could be offered
for every acre of (agricultural) land that is newly forested.  But this would
provide an incentive for landowners to cut down existing forests simply to
replant in a later year in exchange for the government payment.  On the
other hand, a tax could be levied on each acre of land that is deforested.  But
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Table 2. Descriptive Statisticsa
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Gross Agricultural Revenue
($/acre/year) 259.04 44.58 184.77 376.03
Agricultural Production Cost
($/acre/year) 220.39 52.03 143.61 359.81
Forest Revenueb ($/acre/year)
   Mixed Stand 19.29 7.45 6.71 38.36
   Pine Stand 58.96 23.38 19.92 118.24
Tree-Farm Establishment  Cost ($/acre) 92.00 0.00 92.00 92.00
Conversion Cost ($/acre)c 27.71 0.00 27.71 27.71
Fraction of County Naturally
Protected  from Periodic Flooding 0.614 0.264 0.177 1.000
Index of Artificial Flood Protection 0.371 0.371 0.000 1.418
Palmer Hydrological Drought Index 0.74 0.84 -1.05 1.69
Carbon Sequestration due to
Forestationd (tons/acre)
   Natural Regrowth of Harvested
   Mixed Stand 43.36 0.00 43.36 43.36
   Natural Regrowth of Permanent
   Mixed Stand 50.59 0.00 50.59 50.59
   Pine Plantation Periodically Harvested 41.05 0.00 41.05 41.05
   Pine Plantation, Permanent 49.99 0.00 49.99 49.99
Carbon Emissions due to
Deforestation, with Sale of
Merchantable Timber
e
 (tons/acre) 51.83 0.00 51.83 51.83
Carbon Emissions due to
Deforestation, with Burning of all
Material (tons/acre) 72.64 0.00 72.64 72.64
Interest Ratef 5% 0.00 5% 5%
a The sample is of 36 counties in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi, located within the
Lower Mississippi Alluvial Plain.  All monetary amounts are in 1990 dollars; means are
unweighted county averages.
b Gross forest revenue minus harvesting costs; an annuity of stumpage values.
c The historical analysis uses actual conversion costs, varying by year.
d Present value equivalent of life-cycle sequestration.
e Present value equivalent of life-cycle emissions.





































































Table 3.  Alternative Silvicultural Scenarios
Discount Rate = 5 Percent
Species Regime                                                        Natural Regrowth of Mixed Stand                                                      Pine Plantation
Management Regime Periodic Harvest No Periodic Harvest Periodic Harvest                  No Periodic Harvest
Deforestation Regime Timber Salea Site Burnb Timber Salea Site Burnb Timber Salea Site Burnb Timber Salea Site Burnb
Scenario Number #1 #5 #2 #6 #3 #7 #4 #8
Deforestation Carbon
Emissionsc (tons/acre)  Wt
E 51.83 72.64 51.83 72.64 51.83 72.64 51.83 72.64
Forestation Carbon
Sequestrationc (tons/acre) Wt
S                                 43.36                                       50.59                                       41.05 49.99
Annual Forest Revenue
($/acre/year)  fits                                                       19.29                                       0.00                                        58.96 0.00
Establishment Costs ($/acre)
Kit 0.00                                    92.00
a If deforestation occurs, merchantable timber is sold; carbon thereby sequestered is partially and gradually released over time.
b If deforestation occurs, all on-site material is burned.
c Present value equivalent of life-cycle sequestration and emissions; see text for explanation.
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such an approach would provide no added incentive for forestation of land
that is not currently in that state.  One solution is to think of a two-part policy
that combines a subsidy on the flow of newly forested land with a tax on the
flow of (new) deforestation.  As a first approximation, the two price
instruments can be set equal, although this is not necessarily most efficient.
We simulate this policy by treating the subsidy as an increment to forest
revenues in the forestation part of the model (equation (8)) and treating the
tax payment as an increment to conversion or production costs in the
deforestation part of the model (equation (9)).  Letting Zit represent the subsidy
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Thus, a dynamic simulation, based upon equations (7), (8), (9), (10), (14),
and (15), in which the variable Z is set equal to zero, will generate a baseline
quantity of forestation/deforestation over a given time period.15  By carrying
15 The simulated (fitted) values from the model are the set of values that make up the vector
FORCHit for any time t in equation (7).  Multiplying these predicted values of FORCHit by
county land areas, Ti, and adding these products to the elements of the vector Si,t-1 yields
predicted values of Sit, which are in turn fed back into the simulation for the following time
period via the term [S/T]i,t-1 in equations (8) and (9).  The simulation process is actually a
two-stage procedure for each time period, in which the values of the dummy variables, Dit
a
and Dit
c in equation (7), are first predicted on the basis of whether this same equation with
both dummies set equal to unity yields a positive (forestation) or negative (deforestation)
value; then the two dummy variables are adjusted accordingly and the vector FORCHit is
simulated for that time period.  This two-stage approach mirrors the econometric model that
underlies the simulations (Stavins and Jaffe 1990).
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out simulations for various values of Z over the same time period, and
subtracting the results of each from the baseline results, we can trace out a
forest acreage supply function, with marginal cost per acre (Z) arrayed in a
schedule with total change in acreage over the time period, relative to the
baseline.
C. A Dynamic Simulation Model of Carbon Sequestration
For any given parcel of land, there are several types of comparisons that
could be made between the time-paths of carbon emissions/sequestration in a
baseline and a policy simulation (if relative prices are constant over time).
First, we can consider a parcel that is continually in cropland in both
simulations, in which case it exhibits zero net carbon sequestration/emission
over the long run in both, and so the policy impact is also zero. Second, a parcel
may continually be in a forested state in both simulations, in which case it
sequesters carbon in both simulations (if it is periodically harvested, since
atmospheric carbon is converted to wood products), but net sequestration due
to the policy intervention is again zero. Third, a parcel may continually be in
agricultural use in the baseline, but forestation takes place in the policy
simulation in year t. Here, the net carbon sequestration due to the policy
intervention will be the time-path of (varying) annual sequestration (and, in
some cases, emissions) that commence in year t. Fourth, a parcel may
continually be in a forested state in the baseline, but deforestation takes place
in the policy simulation in year t. Now, the net carbon emissions due to the
policy intervention will be the time-path of (varying) annual emissions that
commence in year t.
The next step, conceptually, is to link specific time paths of carbon
sequestration (and emissions) with the various types of forestation and
deforestation specified. Scientific understanding of these linkages is
continually evolving; we base our modeling of the relationships upon state-of-
the-art biological models.  Figure 2 provides a pictorial representation of one
example of the biological time path of carbon sequestration and emission
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linked with a specific forest management regime.16  In the example depicted in
the figure, the time profile is of cumulative carbon sequestration associated
with establishing a new loblolly pine plantation in the study area. Carbon
sequestration occurs in four components of the forest:  trees, understory
vegetation, forest floor, and soil (Birdsey 1992).  When the plantation is
managed as a permanent stand, cumulative sequestration increases
monotonically, with the magnitude of annual increments declining so that an
equilibrium quantity of sequestration is essentially reached within a hundred
years, as material decay comes into balance with natural growth.
The figure also shows the cumulative carbon sequestration path for a
similar stand that is periodically harvested (with 45-year rotations). In this case,
carbon accrues at the same rate as in a permanent stand until the first harvest,
when a substantial amount of carbon is released as a result of harvesting,
processing, and manufacturing of derivative products.17Much of the carbon
sequestered in wood products is also released to the atmosphere, although this
16We employ a set of temporal carbon yield curves, as do Nordhaus (1991), and Richards,
Moulton, and Birdsey (1993).  Other sequestration cost studies have used point estimates of
average flows.
17Although the shares vary greatly among forest types, reference points are:  tree carbon
contains about 80 percent of ecosystem carbon, soil carbon about 15 percent, forest litter 3
percent, and the understory 2 percent.  The variation in these shares is significant; for some
species, soil carbon accounts for nearly 50% of total forest carbon.  Our calculations of
releases from the understory, forest floor, soil, and non-merchantable timber are based upon
Moulton and Richards (1990) and Richards, Moulton, and Birdsey (1993).  The share of
total forest carbon that actually ends up in merchantable wood varies considerably.  A rea-
sonable reference point is about 40%.  Much of the remaining 60% is released at the time of
harvest and in the process of manufacturing wood products (in both cases through combus-
tion), the major exception being soil carbon, which exhibits a much slower decay rate (rea-
sonably assumed to be zero in some cases).
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occurs with considerable delay as wood products decay.18  As can be seen in
the figure, in this scenario the forest is replanted, and the same process takes
place again.
Although the carbon yield curve with harvesting in Figure 2 eventually
moves above the yield curve for a «permanent» stand, this need not be case.  It
depends upon the share of carbon that is initially sequestered in wood products
and upon those products’ decay rates (plus the decay rate of soil carbon).  With
zero decay rates, the peaks in the harvesting yield curve would increase
monotonically, but with positive decay rates, the locus of the peaks approaches
a steady-state quantity of sequestration, and that quantity can, in theory, lie
above or below the level associated with the equilibrium level of the
«permanent» yield curve.
Recognizing the intertemporal nature of net carbon sequestration raises
a question:  how can we associate a number — the marginal cost of carbon
sequestration — with diverse units of carbon that are sequestered in different
years over long time horizons?  This becomes particularly important if we
wish to compare the costs of carbon sequestration with the costs of
conventional carbon abatement measures, such as fuel switching and energy-
efficiency enhancements.  Previous sequestration studies have used a variety
of methods to calculate costs in terms of dollars per ton, the desired units for
18As Sedjo, Wisniewski, Sample, and Kinsman (1995) point out, examinations of the long-
term effects of timber growth on carbon sequestration are «highly dependent upon the as-
sumptions of the life-cycle of the wood products» (p. 23).  Harmon, Farrell, and Franklin
(1990) found this to be the case in their scientific review.  The two critical parameters are the
assumed length of the life-cycle of wood products, and the assumed share of timber biomass
that goes into long-lived wood products.  Drawing upon the work of Row (1992), Row and
Phelps (1990), and Turner et. al. (1993), we develop a time path of gradual decay of wood
products over time, based upon an appropriately weighted average of pulpwood, sawlog,
hardwood, and softwood estimates from Plantinga and Birdsey (1993).  The final profile is
such that one year following harvest, 83 percent of the carbon in wood products remains
sequestered; this percentage falls to 76 percent after 10 years, and 25 percent after 100
years (and is assumed to be constant thereafter).  At an interest rate of 5 percent, the present
value equivalent sequestration is approximately 75 percent, identical to that assumed by
Nordhaus (1991).
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a cost-effectiveness comparison.  These approaches have been classified as:
flow summation, mean-carbon storage, and levelization.  Each has limitations.
The first approach is the simplest:  the present value of costs is divided
by the total tons of carbon sequestered, regardless of when sequestration
occurs.  This summary statistic has several obvious problems associated with
it:  first, it fails to take into account the time profile of sequestration; and
second, the measure is very sensitive to the length of the time horizon selected
for calculation (in the case of periodic-harvesting scenarios).  Furthermore,
assuming that not only costs but also benefits of sequestration are to be
discounted over time, this approach implies that marginal benefits of
sequestration are increasing exponentially over time at the discount rate.  A
similar summary statistic is based upon mean carbon storage.  In this case,
the present value of costs is divided by the numerical average of annual
carbon storage.  This statistic suffers from the same problems as the first.
The third alternative summary statistic seems most reasonable, and is
utilized here: the discounted present value of costs is divided by the
discounted present value of tons sequestered.  This approach may be thought
of as assuming that the marginal damages associated with additional units of
atmospheric carbon are constant and that benefits (avoided damages) and
costs are to be discounted at the same rate.  Note that such an assumption of
constant marginal benefits is approximately correct if marginal damages are
essentially proportional to the rate of climate change, which many studies
have asserted. We initially use a 5 percent rate, supplemented later by
sensitivity analysis.
By developing the constituent intertemporal yield curves for various forest
species,19 location, and management conditions, we calculate a set of present-
19 The yield curves provided in Figure 2 are simply examples for one species, loblolly pine.
The growth curves that underlie respective yield curves are themselves a function, partly, of
precipitation and temperature, both of which are presumably affected in the long run by
atmospheric concentrations of CO2 and induced climate change (Dixon, Brown, Houghton,
Solomon, Trexler, and Wisniewski 1994).  We ignore this endogeneity to climate change in
estimating sequestration costs, as have all previous studies.  Likewise, all studies have ig-
nored potential economic endogeneity of relevant variables to climate change (Sohngen and
Mendelsohn 1995).
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value equivalent carbon-sequestration measures associated with:  natural
regrowth of a harvested mixed stand (43.36 tons); natural regrowth of a
permanent mixed stand (50.59 tons); a pine plantation periodically harvested
(41.05 tons); and a permanent pine plantation (49.99 tons).  Additionally, we
calculate present-value carbon emission measures for:  deforestation with sale
of merchantable timber (51.83 tons); and deforestation with burning of all on-
site material (72.64 tons).  These values are reported in Tables 2 and 3.
We define the present values (in year t) of the time-paths of carbon
sequestration and carbon emissions associated with forestation or
deforestation occurring in year t as    t
S and     t
E, respectively.  Thus, the total,
present-value equivalent net carbon sequestration/emissions associated with
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and where CSh and CEh are, respectively, annual incremental carbon
sequestration and carbon emissions per acre under individual scenarios.
It might be argued that since the policy intervention we model is a tax/
subsidy on land use, not on carbon emissions and sequestration, it does not
lead to the true minimum carbon sequestration marginal cost function.  This
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20Recall that both dollars of costs and tons of sequestration (and emission) are discounted.
Hence, annual sequestration refers to an annuity that is equivalent to a respective present
value (employing a discount rate of 5 percent).
21For a detailed analysis of all eight scenarios and an examination of the sensitivity of carbon
sequestration costs to changes in critical factors, see: Newell and Stavins 1998.
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may seem to be a valid criticism in the narrowest analytic sense, but it is not
valid in a realistic policy context.  It would be virtually impossible to levy a
tax on carbon emissions or a subsidy on sequestration, because the costs of
administering such policy interventions would be prohibitive.  Looked at
this way, it becomes clear that such an instrument would likely be more costly
per unit of carbon sequestered than would the deforestation tax/forestation
subsidy policy considered here.
A simulation of equations (16), (17), and (18) with the subsidy/tax, Z, set
equal to zero (in equations (14) and (15)) generates a baseline quantity of
carbon sequestration/emissions.  By subtracting this quantity from the results
of simulations employing positive values of Z, we trace out a supply curve of
net carbon sequestration, in which the marginal costs of carbon sequestration,
measured in dollars per ton, can be arrayed in a schedule with net annual20
carbon sequestration.
III. Empirical Application
By way of example, Table 4 provides the results for a periodically
harvested pine plantation, with the sale of merchantable timber when/if
deforestation occurs.21  Such a scenario is most directly comparable with
those examined in other studies.  The relatively attractive forest revenues
associated with this management regime result in a small amount of net
forestation taking place in the baseline simulation, a gain of about 52 thousand
acres (over the 90-year study period).  Baseline net carbon sequestration is
approximately 4.6 million tons annually.  Marginal costs of carbon
sequestration increase gradually, until these costs are about $66 per ton,JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
22An additional advantage of the econometric approach to estimating the marginal cost
function is that error bounds can be established through stochastic simulations, drawing
upon the estimated variance-covariance matrix.
where annual sequestration relative to the baseline has reached about 7 million
tons.  This level of sequestration is associated with a land-use tax/subsidy of
$100 per acre and net forestation, relative to baseline, of 4.7 million acres.
Beyond this point, marginal costs depart more rapidly from a linear trend.
Beyond about $200 per ton, they turn steeply upward (Figure 3).22  Indeed,
the marginal cost function is nearly asymptotic to a sequestration level of
about 15 to 16 million tons annually.  This is not surprising, since such an
implicit limit would be associated with net forestation of about 10.5 million
acres, for a total forested area of 13 million acres, just shy of the total area of
the study region.
Because of variations in methodology and differences in geographic area
of analysis, it is difficult to make direct comparisons of results among carbon-
sequestration studies.  Most studies have not even reported marginal cost
functions; instead the vast majority have simply provided a single point
estimate of average sequestration costs at some level of total sequestration.
If marginal costs are increasing, indeed steeply increasing after some point,
as the present study suggests, then such single point estimates of average
costs are of only very limited use.  Indeed, they can be misleading if improperly
applied.
In Table 5, we have summarized the results of some of the best and most
comparable studies of carbon sequestration.  Six of the nine studies provide
estimates of a marginal cost function.  We summarize the results in the table
along three dimensions:  total quantity (of land affected and carbon
sequestered), average cost, and marginal cost.
The most direct comparison that can be made is with the work of Richards,
Moulton, and Birdsey (1993), who used an engineering approach to develop
estimates for the Delta states (of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi).  The
comparison is of particular interest because many of the other dimensions of
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Table 4. Simulated Land Changes and Carbon Sequestration
Scenario #3:  Periodically Harvested Pine Plantation, Sale of Merchantable Timber
at Deforestation  - Discount Rate = 5 Percent
  Baseline Deforestation = + 51,654 acres               Baseline Carbon Sequestration = 4,578,202 tons
Marginal Cost Forestation Average Cost Annual Carbon Marginal Cost Average Cost
per Acre Relative to per Acre Sequestration of Carbon  of Carbon
($/acre/yr)  Baseline  ($/acre/yr) Relative to Sequestration  Sequestration
(1,000s acres) Baseline ($/ton) ($/ton)
(1,000s tons/yr)
0 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
10 518 10.00 784 6.61 6.61
20 1,057 15.10 1,600 13.21 9.97
30 1,615 20.25 2,445 19.82 13.38
40 2,192 5.45 3,319 26.42 16.81
50 2,787 30.69 4,219 33.03 20.27
60 3,398 35.96 5,145 39.63 23.76
70 3,893 41.27 5,895 46.24 27.26
80 4,224 46.60 6,395 52.84 30.78
90 4,455 51.95 6,745 59.45 34.31
100 4,653 57.32 7,045 66.05 37.86
200 6,579 105.63 9,961 135.97 69.77
300 7,484 129.15 11,332 202.03 85.31
400 7,897 142.25 11,957 268.05 93.96
500 8,212 155.98 12,434 334.11 103.03
600 8,470 169.22 12,825 400.18 111.77
700 8,689 182.74 13,156 466.22 120.71
800 8,874 195.72 13,437 532.20 129.28
900 9,038 208.21 13,685 598.31 137.53
1000 9,178 219.53 13,897 664.35 145.01
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the analyses are quite similar.  Since the present study focuses on just 36
counties in the Delta states, however, it is possible to compare the results
only by extrapolating from the study area to the larger tri-state region.  The
marginal cost function that is thereby developed23 is much steeper than that
of Richards, Moulton, and Birdsey (1993), and lies below it up to about 30
million tons of carbon sequestration (marginal cost of about $22).
So that we can directly compare the results from our own and other studies,
we need to normalize the results to some common set of standards.  Since
the other studies of carbon sequestration costs (and carbon abatement costs,
as discussed later) are for the U.S. as a whole, one thing we need to do is
normalize our results for the U.S.  In doing so, it is important to recognize
that the marginal costs of sequestration in the Delta states are not necessarily
representative of nationwide sequestration costs.24 The purpose of the
normalization is to provide a basis for comparison of study results. The
purpose is not to provide definitive cost estimates for the entire U.S. on the
basis of a regional econometric analysis.
First, we can scale up the horizontal dimension from Figure 3 to represent
the change from the study area to the relevant U.S. land base.25  Second, we
23The 36 counties in the study area represent 13.34 percent of the total area of the three states.
If the study area were perfectly representative of the total area, we could multiply our quantity
results by 7.5 to compare with the three-state results of Richards.  Of course, the study area is
not truly representative of the total three-state area along all relevant dimensions.  For one thing,
it contains better quality (for agriculture) land.  On the other hand, there are large areas of
government owned lands outside the 36 counties; these would be unaffected by economic
signals.  These factors work in opposite directions.  We use the multiplier of 7.5 simply for the
purpose of demonstrating how the results may be related to those of others.
24 It is likely that the difference is not very great.  During the relevant time period, farm real
estate prices in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi have tended to be about 15 to 20 percent
greater than the U.S. average.  Hence, opportunity costs of carbon sequestration are somewhat
higher in the Delta states, and the actual U.S. marginal cost function probably lies somewhat
below the function portrayed in Figure 4, but not significantly so.
25 The scaling factor is equal to the ratio of total farm acreage in the continental U.S. (551
million acres in Richards, Moulton, and Birdsey 1993) to total farm acreage in our 36 study
counties (10.6 million acres).  It is agricultural acreage alone that is relevant for the
normalization because in the scenario considered (#3) there is no deforestation in the baseline
(and hence all carbon sequestration is coming from planting trees on formerly agricultural
land).
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Table 5. Comparison with results from other studies
Study                                                   Total Quantity                  Average Cost                 Marginal Cost
Land Carbon Land Carbon Land Carbon
(mil. acres)  (mil. tons/yr)  ($/acre/yr) ($/ton) ($/acre/yr) ($/ton)
This Studya
     United States normalization 342 518 106 70 < 200 < 136
     Delta States  5  7 58 8 < 100 < 66
Moulton and Richards (1990)
     United Statesb 269 690 -- 27 < 81 < 37
     Delta States Cropland 25 67 50 22 -- ..
Richards, Moulton, and
Birdsey (1993)
    United Statesc 244 416 -- -- -- < 41
     Delta States Croplandd 11 29 42 18 < 52 < 22
Adams, et al. (1993)e 274 700 -- -- -- < 27
Nordhaus (1991)f 248 44 81 64 -- --
Parks and Hardie (1995)g 92 2 4 9 2 1 - - <  2 4
Rubin et al. (1992)h 71 73 -- 23 -- --
Dudek and LeBlanc (1990)i 14 -- -- 39 -- --
Plantinga (1995)j 0.65 1.5 -- -- -- 6-13
Callaway and McCarl (1996)k 187 280 -- -- -- < 25
a From Scenario 3, pine plantation, periodically harvested, at a 5% discount rate.
b Permanent stands on cropland and pastureland only, i.e., not forest land.
c Figure for total U.S. carbon sequestration is an annuity calculated at 5% over 160 years.
d These figures were used, but not reported, in Richards, Moulton, and Birdsey (1993). Reference is to a perma-
nent pine stand, based on data provided in a personal communication from Richards (1994).  Carbon costs and
tonnages were annualized over 160 years at a 5% discount rate.
e Nationwide results for a scenario with harvesting and sale of timber (Table 1, p. 79 and Table 4, p. 83), recalcu-
lated at a 5% discount rate.
f Permanent forestation of «marginal U.S. land» (Table 8, p. 60).  For this and other studies, we have converted
to acres at a rate of one hectare = 2.477 acres and to short tons at a rate of one metric ton = 1.102 short tons.
g Figures are for U.S. cropland-only scenario (Table 1, p. 127).  Marginal costs were computed from marginal cost
formula for Figure 4 (p. 131) using 22 million tons per year and annualized using a 4 percent discount rate over
10 years.
h Nationwide results converted from original study (Table 3, p 261) at a rate of 3.67 tons of carbon dioxide ( CO2)
equals one ton of carbon, and into short tons from metric tons.
i An average permanent stand of U.S. tree species, from Table 3, p. 36; CO2 converted to carbon.
j Figures are for a 14-county region of Wisconsin for the scenario assuming a least-cost program at a 4% discount
rate and a constant annual sequestration rate of 2.25 tons of carbon per acre (Table II).  Hectares converted to
acres.
k Calculations use a 5% discount rate, employ carbon yield functions from Birdsey (1992), and do not allow for
farm programs.
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normalize the results from other studies by converting those results to
appropriately discounted units.  The results of this process are provided in
Figure 4, where our own results are compared with those of Richards,
Moulton, and Birdsey (1993), Adams, et.al. (1993), and Callaway and McCarl
(1996).  All of these alternative marginal cost functions lie within our 95
percent confidence interval, at least up to 300 million tons/year in the case
of Adams, et.al. (1993), but all are less steep than our central tendency and
lie well below it for most of their ranges.  Overall, the general impression
from this study is that the marginal costs of carbon sequestration are at least
as great and may well be greater than previously reported.26
Returning to Table 5, we can also calculate the net carbon sequestration
per acre implied by the various analyses. The figure for the Delta states from
Richards, Moulton and Birdsey (1993) is 2.64 tons per acre annually. Our
implicit net sequestration for the equivalent management regime — Scenario
4, pine plantations with no periodic harvesting — is considerably less, 1.85
tons per acre annually.  Since our carbon yield curves are closely related to
those employed by Richards, Moulton, and Birdsey (1993), why does this
significant difference exist?
The answer may provide some insight into potential advantages of the
approach taken in this study.  If the model of Richards, Moulton, and Birdsey
(1993) were accurate in terms of its structural assumptions (and input data)
that landowners behave "optimally" and immediately in response to economic
signals and if our analysis were likewise correctly specified, then the marginal
cost function simulated from our econometrically-based approach (and hence
the implicit annual tons of carbon per acre) ought to be more or less the
same as theirs.  They are not.  One possible explanation brings attention to a
central advantage of an econometric approach:  landowners do not necessarily
26 Although these marginal costs are greater than the best independent estimates of the
respective marginal costs of carbon abatement (through fuel switching and increased energy
efficiency), the evidence indicates that carbon sequestration would be part, albeit a minority
share, of a cost-effective portfolio of strategies in the United States, at least in the short run
(Stavins 1998).
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respond in the "optimal" and immediate fashion assumed in the engineering
models.  Indeed, the econometric evidence suggest that landowners have in
the past responded to economic signals with considerable delay, particularly
when shifting land use from agriculture to forestry.  Thus, in our model a
given tax/subsidy produces land-use changes, but not only may they be smaller
than what is anticipated by Richards, Moulton, and Birdsey (1993) and others,
but, more to the point, even if they are of the same magnitude in the steady
state, our analysis suggests that those land-use responses will be drawn out
over a considerable amount of time.  In a world with discounting, this
difference can be significant indeed.
IV.  Implications for Future Research
Opportunities for future research are plentiful.  The model developed
here can be improved along a number of dimensions.  Some improvements
would represent not just marginal refinements of the current model, but rather
improvements in the sense of a new and better model.  Primary among these
is endogenizing any one of a number of variables that are currently taken as
exogenous:  agricultural and forestry product prices; the mix of cultivated
crops and forest species; and management regimes.27  A general equilibrium
approach should be possible, both at the econometric stage and in the
simulations.  This would not simply be desirable, but necessary, if the general
approach developed here were to be applied directly to estimate the carbon
sequestration marginal cost function for the United States as a whole.
Finally, we can comment briefly on the methodological implications of
this work.  The major advantage of our approach over the models that have
27It would be desirable to allow for the endogeneity of forest rotation length.  Another ap-
proach to estimating the carbon supply function is found in a paper by Van Kooten, Binkley,
and Delecourt (1995); they examine the sensitivity of the socially optimal rotation length to
alternative values of carbon (dollars per ton), and thus develop a supply curve of carbon per
acre.  As timber prices increase, the optimal rotation length decreases; and as carbon value
increases, the (socially) optimal rotation length increases.
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dominated the literature on carbon sequestration is that simulations of
marginal costs build directly upon revealed-preference patterns of how
landowners have actually responded to the economic incentives they
continually face regarding the alternative uses of their lands.  This is in
contrast with engineering approaches that build up marginal cost functions
by aggregating point estimates of how landowners in a particular region or
owning a particular type of land ought to behave, and in contrast with
optimization models that often do much the same thing.
As is well known, landowners tend not to behave as they “ought” farmers,
in particular, are notoriously sluggish in responding to some of the economic
signals they face.  For one thing, they are affected by non-pecuniary factors,
including a desire to stay on the farm for reasons associated more with
perceived quality of life than with financial returns.  An econometric model
based upon an underlying optimization model and allowing for “partial
adjustment” or other phenomena can capture, albeit in a crude way, such
land-use behavior.  Hence, the land-use simulations that come from it, along
with the respective estimates of carbon-sequestration costs may be better
approximations of reality.
Linking a dynamic simulation model of carbon sequestration with an
econometric model of land use has the potential of adding significantly to
understanding of the costs of this frequently discussed approach to addressing
the threat of global climate change.  There is a growing literature of
econometric analyses of forestation and deforestation (Panayotou and
Sungsuwan 1989; Parks and Kramer 1995; Pfaff 1995; Reis and Guzmán
1992; and Southgate, Sierra, and Brown 1991).  At least some of these can
serve as the basis for revealed-preference analytical models of the respective
marginal costs of carbon sequestration.
References
Adams, Richard M., Darius M. Adams, John M. Callaway, Ching-cheng
Chang, and Bruce A. McCarl.  "Sequestering Carbon on Agricultural Land:
264A METHODOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE COSTS OF CARBON SEQUESTRATION
Social Cost and Impacts on Timber Markets."  Contemporary Policy Issues
11(1993):76-87.
Birdsey, Richard A.  Carbon Storage and Accumulation in United States
Forest Ecosystems.  U.S. Forest Service General Technical Report WO-
59.  Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1992.
Callaway, J. M. and Bruce McCarl.  AThe Economic Consequences of
Substituting Carbon Payments for Crop Subsidies in U.S. Agriculture.
Environmental and Resource Economics 7(1996):15-43.
Clinton, William J. and Albert Gore, Jr.  The Climate Change Action Plan.
Washington, D.C.:  White House Office of Environmental Policy, 1993.
Daniels, Robert.  Personal communication, Mississippi State University,
Agricultural Extension Service, Starkville, Mississippi, 1994.
Dixon, R. K., S. Brown, R. A. Houghton, A. M. Solomon, M. C. Trexler, and
J. Wisniewski.  "Carbon Pools and Flux of Global Forest Ecosystems."
Science 263(1994):185-190.
Dixon, Robert K., Jack K. Winjum, Kenneth J. Andrasko, Jeffrey J. Lee, and
Paul E. Schroeder.  "Integrated Land-Use Systems:  Assessment of
Promising Agroforest and Alternative Land-Use Practices to Enhance
Carbon Conservation and Sequestration."  Climatic Change 27(1994):71-
92.
Dudek, Daniel J. and Alice LeBlanc.  "Offsetting New CO2 Emissions:  A
Rational First Greenhouse Policy Step."  Contemporary Policy Issues
8(1990):29-42.
Harmon, M. E., W. K. Farrell, and J. F. Franklin.  "Effects on Carbon Storage
of Conversion of Old-Growth Forest to Young Forests."  Science
247(1990):699-702.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Report of Working Group III
— Socioeconomic Analysis.  Draft Report.  Geneva, Switzerland:  IPCC,
1994.
Jepma, C. J., M. Asaduzzaman, I. Mintzer, S. Maya, and M. Al-Moneef.  "A
Generic Assessment of Response Options."  Draft.  Intergovernmental
265JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Panel on Climate Change, Report of Working Group III, Geneva,
Switzerland, January 20, 1995.
Lashof, Daniel A. and Dennis A. Tirpak, eds.  Policy Options for Stabilizing
Global Climate.  Draft Report to Congress.  Office of Policy, Planning,
and Evaluation.  Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 1989.
Marland, Greg.  The Prospect of Solving the CO2 Problem Through Global
Reforestation.  DOE/NBB-0082.  Washington, DC:  U.S. Department of
Energy, 1988.
Masera, Omar, Mauricio R. Bellon, and Gerardo Segura.  “Forestry Options
for Sequestering Carbon in Mexico: Comparative Economic Analysis of
Three Case Studies.  Paper presented at Terrestrial Carbon Sequestration:
An Economic Synthesis Workshop, Bergendal, Sweden, May 15-19, 1995.
Moulton, Robert J. and Kenneth R. Richards.  1990.  "Costs of Sequestering
Carbon Through Tree Planting and Forest Management in The United
States."  GTR WO-58.  Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Forest Service.
National Academy of Sciences.  Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming:
Mitigation, Adaptation, and the Science Base.  Washington, DC:  National
Academy Press, 1992.
Newell, Richard G. and Robert N. Stavins.  “Climate Change and Forest
Sinks: Factors Affecting the Costs of Carbon Sequestration.”  Working
Paper, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, September 1998.
New York State Energy Office.  Analysis of Carbon Reduction in New York
State.  Albany, 1993.
Nordhaus, William D.  "The Cost of Slowing Climate Change:  A Survey."
The Energy Journal, volume 12, number 1, 1991, pp. 37-65.
Panayotou, Theodore and Somthawin Sungsuwan.  "An Econometric Study
of the Causes of Tropical Deforestation:  The Case of Northeast Thailand."
HIID Development Discussion Paper No. 284, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
March 1989.
266A METHODOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE COSTS OF CARBON SEQUESTRATION
Parks, Peter J.  "Explaining ‘Irrational’ Land Use:  Risk Aversion and Marginal
Agricultural Land."  Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 28(1995):34-47.
Parks, Peter J. and Ian W. Hardie.  "Least-cost Forest Carbon Reserves: Cost-
Effective Subsidies to Convert Marginal Agricultural Land to Forests."
Land Economics 71(1995):122-136.
Parks, Peter J. and Randall A. Kramer.  "A Policy Simulation of the Wetlands
Reserve Program."  Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 28(1995):223-240.
Pfaff, Alexander S.  "What Drives Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon?"
Working paper, Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, July 1995.
Pindyck, Robert S.  "Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment." Journal
of Economic Literature 29(1991):1110-1152.
Plantinga, Andrew J.  "The Costs of Carbon Sequestration in Forests:  A
Positive Analysis."  Paper presented at Terrestrial Carbon Sequestration:
An Economic Synthesis Workshop, Bergendal, Sweden, May 15-19, 1995.
Plantinga, Andrew J. and Richard A. Birdsey.  "Carbon Fluxes Resulting
from U.S. Private Timberland Management."  Climatic Change
23(1993):37-53.
Reis, Eustáquio J. and Rolando M. Guzmán.  "An Econometric Model of
Amazon Deforestation."  Texto Para Discussão No. 265, Instituto de
Pesquisa Econômica Alicada, Barasilia, Brazil, June 1992.
Richards, Kenneth R., Robert J. Moulton, and Richard A. Birdsey.  1993.
"Costs of Creating Carbon Sinks in the U.S."  Energy Conservation and
Management 34:905-912.
Richards, Kenneth R. and Carrie Stokes.  "Regional Studies of Carbon
Sequestration: A Review and Critique."  Mimeo, Pacific Northwest
Laboratory, Washington, D.C., June 1995.
Row, Clark.  "HARVCARB:  Modeling Forest Management and the Carbon
Balance."  Paper presented at the Western Forest Economics meeting,
Welches, Oregon, May 4-6, 1992.
267JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Row, Clark and Robert B. Phelps.  "Tracing the Flow of Carbon Through the
U.S. Forest Products Sector."  Proceedings of the 19th World Congress
of the International Union of Forest Research Organizations, Montreal,
Canada, August 5, 1990.
Rubin, Edwin S., Richard N. Cooper, Robert A. Frosch, Thomas H. Lee,
Gregg Marland, Arthur H. Rosenfeld, and Deborah D. Stine.  "Realistic
Mitigation Options for Global Warming."  Science 257(1992):148-149,
261-266.
Sedjo, Roger A. and Allen M. Solomon.  "Climate and Forests."  Greenhouse
Warming:  Abatement and Adaptation, Normon J. Rosenberg, William E.
Easterling III, Pierre R. Crosson, and Joel Darmstadter, eds.  Washington,
DC:  Resources for the Future, 1989.
Sedjo, Roger A., Joe Wisniewski, Al Sample, and John D. Kinsman.
"Managing Carbon via Forestry:  Assessment of Some Economic Studies."
Discussion Paper 95-06, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.,
November 1994.
Sohngen, Brent, and Robert Mendelsohn.  "A Dynamic Model of Forest
Carbon Storage During Climate Change."  Paper presented at Terrestrial
Carbon Sequestration:  An Economic Synthesis Workshop, Bergendal,
Sweden, May 15-19, 1995.
Southgate, Douglas, Rodrigo Sierra, and Lawrence Brown.  "The Causes of
Tropical Deforestation in Ecuador:  A Statistic Analysis."  World
Development 19(1991):1145-1151.
Stavins, Robert N.  "Alternative Renewable Resource Strategies: A Simulation
of Optimal Use."  Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
19(1990):143-159.
Stavins, Robert N.  “The Costs of Carbon Sequestration: A Revealed-
Preference Approach.”  American Economic Review, forthcoming, 1998.
Stavins, Robert N. and Adam B. Jaffe.  "Unintended Impacts of Public
Investments on Private Decisions: The Depletion of Forested Wetlands."
American Economic Review 80(1990):337-352.
Swinehart, Susan.  “Afforestation as a Method of Carbon Sequestration: A
268A METHODOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE COSTS OF CARBON SEQUESTRATION
Cost-Benefit Analysis.”  Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of
Operations Research/Engineering-Economic Systems, Stanford
University, Stanford, California, 1996.
Theil, Henri.  Economic Forecasts and Policy.  Amsterdam:  North-Holland,
1961.
Trexler, Mark C.  Minding the Carbon Store:  Weighing U.S. Forestry
Strategies to Slow Global Warming.  Washington, DC:  World Resources
Institute, 1991.
Turner, D. P., J J. Lee, G. J. Koperper, and J. R. Barker, eds.  The Forest
Sector Carbon Budget of the United States:  Carbon Pools and Flux
Under Alternative Policy Assumptions.  Corvallis, Oregon:  U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, 1993.
United Nations General Assembly.  "United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change."  A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.I and A/AC.237/18 (Part
II/Add.1/Corr.1).  New York, 1992.
U.S. Department of Energy.  National Energy Strategy:  Powerful Ideas for
America.  Washington, D.C., February 1991.
Van Kooten, G. Cornelis, L. Arthur, and W. Wilson.  "Potential to Sequester
Carbon in Canadian Forests:  Some Economic Considerations."  Canadian
Public Policy 18(1992):127-138.
Van Kooten, G. Cornelis, Clark S. Binkley, and Gregg Delecourt.  "Effect of
Carbon Taxes and Subsidies on Optimal Forest Rotation Age and Supply
of Carbon Services."  American Journal of Agricultural Economics
77(1995):365-374.
Winjum, J. K., R. K. Dixon, and P. E. Schroeder.  "Estimation of the Global
Potential of Forest and Agroforest Management Practices to Sequester
Carbon."  Water, Air, and Soil Pollution 62(1992):213-227.
269JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Appendix 1. Solving the Dynamic Optimization Problem
(A 1)
Because of the linear nature of the objective function (equation (1) in
the text), the optimal control turns out to have the usual "bang-bang" form.
The solution, documented in greater detail in Stavins and Jaffe (1990) and
Stavins (1990), proceeds as follows.  First, the Hamiltonian equation, with
wit as the costate variable, is:
According to the maximum principle, the following complementary





Evaluation of the partial derivatives in the first set of necessary conditions
yields:
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Substituting from equation (5) into equation (6),
(A 7)
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If landowners have static expectations regarding all variables, the necess
condition for target deforestation (conversion of forest to farm) reduces to:
[ ] 0   >   FN   +   C   -   M   -   q A      if      g   =    g it it it ijt it ijt
*
ijt
otherwise     0 =    g
*
ijt
where FNit, net forestry revenue, equals Fit - Wit, , and Fit = fit/rt.
Likewise, for forestation (conversion of farm to forest), equation (5) is
substituted into equation (7), yielding the necessary condition for targeted
forestation:
[] 0   >     M   -   q A   -   F      if      v   =    v it ijt it it ijt
*
ijt
otherwise     0 =   
*
ijt n
where F ˜it, delayed net forest revenue, equals Fit - Dit.
Equation (10) indicates that forestation should occur if a parcel is
cropland and:
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Appendix 2. Aggregation of Necessary Conditions
(B1)
(B2)
This is identical to condition (5) in the text.  A parcel of cropland should
converted to forestry use if the present value of expected net forest revenue
exceeds the present value of expected net agricultural revenue.  Likewise,
equation (9) indicates that deforestation should occur if a parcel is forested
and:
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This is identical to condition (6) in the text.  A forested parcel should be
converted to cropland if the present value of expected net agricultural revenue
exceeds the present value of expected net forest revenue plus conversion
costs.
Inequalities (5) and (6) in the text imply that all land (of given quality) in
a county will be in the same use in the steady state.  In reality, counties are
observed to be a mix of forest and farmland.  Although this may partly reflect
deviations from the steady state, it is due largely to the heterogeneity of
land, particularly in regard to its quality (suitability) for agriculture.  Such
heterogeneity can be characterized in terms of a probability density function,
F {qijt}, posited as a parametric lognormal relationship, because the general
shape of that distribution is reasonable for a distribution of land quality:A METHODOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE COSTS OF CARBON SEQUESTRATION
Denoting the left-hand side of inequality (5) in the text by Yijt, we note
there is an incentive to carry out forestation if Yijt > 0.  Hence, there 
threshold value of land quality (qijt), denoted qit
y, below which the incen



















where Ni is the share of a county that is naturally protected from periodic
flooding; Eit is an index of the share of a county that has been artificially
protected from flooding by Federal programs (by time t); and b1 is a
parameter that indicates the impact of artificial flood protection relative to
the impact of natural flood protection.  The logistic specification is used to
constrain dit to values between zero and unity, because empirical measures
of Ni and Eit are only indexes of protection.
As described by Stavins (1990), a more general approach is to allow for
the possibility that decisions by the government to protect land from
flooding are not made independently from the land's relative potential for
agricultural production.  Thus, the underlying heterogeneity is itself
affected by projects, and the parameters of the lognormal distribution, m
and s
2, are themselves functions of Eit:
Likewise, by denoting the left-hand side of inequality (6) in the text by Xijt,
we note that there is an incentive to carry out deforestation if Xijt > 0.
Therefore, there exists a threshold value of land quality (qijt), denoted qit
x,









   
C   -   A










it 2 ijt ú û
ù
ê ë
é b s B m » ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
) d    -    (1 y  probabilit    with    0   =   q it ijtJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS















Since there is an incentive to deforest parcel j (in county i at time t) if
qijt > qit
x, the (privately) optimal (the desired or target) stock of deforested
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where Fi[.] is the cumulative lognormal distribution function, and
where F[.] is the cumulative, standard normal distribution function.
There is an analogous equation for forestation, which gives the target
stock of forested land as a fraction of the total available land:
where  qit
y is the threshold value of qijt below which the incentive for
forestation manifests itself.
As described in detail by Stavins and Jaffe (1990), two specification
issues must be addressed before the model embodied in equations (8) and
(9), above, can be estimated:  the possibility that adjustment toward
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1 It might seem that a superior approach would be to incorporate adjustment costs or lags
into the original optimization problem, but this cannot be done in a way which yields necessary
conditions which can be aggregated across heterogeneous parcels to the county level.  Any
such mechanism must depend on deviations of individual parcels from optimality.  Estimating
a model with adjustment costs requires observing the relationship between the magnitude of
deviations from equilibrium and the rate of movement.  Since we do not observe individual
parcels, this cannot be done, so any adjustment mechanism built into the individual model
(B10)
where  ga is the rate of partial adjustment and eit
a is an error term
composed of a county-specific (time-invariant) component, li, and a
component, fit
a, which has mean zero.  Since county-level stocks of
forested land and agricultural land are aggregates of individual decisions,
these adjustment parameters represent the probability that a landowner
not in equilibrium in a given time period will switch to the optimal land
use within the initial period.
1
optimal land use is not instantaneous; and combining the deforestation and
forestation models into a single equation to be estimated.
As discussed in the text of the present paper, there are various
reasons why land-use adjustment may not occur instantaneously.
Hence, we allow for the possibility of partial adjustment in each
observation period toward the optimal land-use pattern.  In the case of
deforestation, we have:
·
where  gc is the rate of partial adjustment and eit
c is an error term
composed of a county-specific (time-invariant) component, li, and a
component, fit
c, which has mean zero, so that eit
c = li + fit
c.  Likewise,
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could not be estimated with county data.  One could specify a version of equation (1) with
adjustment costs at the county level, but that would be equivalent to a representative-firm
assumption.  Thus, a fully dynamic optimal model can only be implemented with individual
data.
2 The dummy variables are endogenous.  In the econometric estimation, the forestation and
deforestation are first estimated separately to predict values for the dummy variables to be
used when, in a second stage, equation (13) is estimated.
Next, to combine equations (10) and (11) into one relationship, we
define the net change in the forested fraction of the county between
periods  t-1 and t as:
e g g it











it it    +       
T
S
   -      
T
S
       D    +       
T
AG
   -      
T
AG



































a are dummy variables
2 for deforestation and forestation
regimes; [AG/T]* and [S/T]* are the corresponding target stocks from
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Under the assumptions of the model, deforestation and forestation will
never occur simultaneously in the same county, and so we can write:
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In the econometric estimation, the county-specific components of the
error term, li, are treated as fixed-effect parameters and the fit are assumed
to be independently distributed across i and t, but not necessarily
homoscedastic.  Thus, equation (13) leads to a single-equation, fixed-effects
model, the parameters of which can be estimated by nonlinear least squares
with county dummy variables employed to eliminate any bias due to the
county fixed effect.  The final model is thus:
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x are defined, respectively, by equations (2), (4), and (5),
above.  These six equations make up the complete econometric model and
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